The notion that not only facts but also personal and communal beliefs contribute to scientific knowledge has become commonplace. Christians such as Dr. Cornelis Van Dam have welcomed this notion, not because they want to acknowledge the social dimension of knowledge acquisition, but because it allows them arbitrarily to deny the truth of those parts of science that they believe are threatening to them and their community of faith (see his editorials in Clarion of January 29 and February 12, 2010). If the content of scientific theories is influenced by background beliefs, they argue, then this levels the playing field between, say, naturalism and theism. They do not realize that this move is very costly from a Christian perspective. For one, truth about nature is made to depend completely on the beliefs of the community with the most power. For another, truth no longer depends on what exists objectively as created by God. This raises important questions. How can people with different belief systems work together in science? Can scientific knowledge be trusted if it is shaped and sometimes distorted by beliefs operating in the background of science (background beliefs)? Is it possible to acknowledge the role of background beliefs in science (subjectivity) and avoid turning background beliefs into the sole source of knowledge of nature (subjectivism)?
In this essay I explain why background beliefs are required for the construction of theories in science. I argue that background beliefs do not normally distort scientific knowledge because God created an objectively existing reality that resists distortion. Therefore, the background beliefs of scientists do not dictate the content of scientific knowledge. The conclusion is that people with different belief systems, including Christians, can work together in scientific research.
This essay also aims at clarifying how to discern between truth and falsehood in science. The first thing to understand is that everyone — and that includes those with a lot of education — is a lay person in all domains of knowledge except one’s own specialty. This means that everyone’s knowledge is affected by what is available in the knowledge market. Thus everyone has to learn discernment. But especially Christians have to learn to separate the chaff from the wheat. Failure to do so results in an inability to give an account of one’s faith, or worse, it results in creating confusion.
The essay can be found in our “Collected Papers”; a direct link is here. We welcome your responses.
Note added 22 May 2013: A revised version was invited and is now published as Jitse van der Meer, “Background Beliefs, Ideology, and Science”, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith v. 65, n. 2 (June 2013), pp. 87-103.
Showing posts with label realism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label realism. Show all posts
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
Thursday, June 4, 2009
Against Scientific Geocentrism
In a recent comment, John van Popta cites, apparently favourably, the geocentrism of van der Kamp. I never did have the honour of meeting “Kampee” as he was apparently affectionately known. But for a short time about a dozen years ago, I was involved in what I thought was a private internet discussion on geocentrism (mostly critiquing it while seeking to understand and appreciate it), and you can actually still find what must have been the most favourable thing I said about it quoted in The Geocentric Bible (!):
“no physicist I know says that the earth in any absolute sense travels around the sun. Science today does not claim that there is an absolute reference frame in which the earth is moving.”
This is apparently the best thing any Ph.D. physicist has said which could be construed to be in favour of geocentrism, at least in terms of “reference frames”. (Unfortunately, I can no longer find my other comments from that discussion.) Einstein’s theory of general relativity allows one to show how measurements of space and time correspond between references frames which are moving (in fact accelerating) relative to one another, and eschews the concept of an absolute point or system of reference from which space and time ought to be measured. However, one should not assume that the instrumentalist view is implied by general relativity, or that geocentrism is thusly made tenable. In astronomy, one does indeed usually employ an earth-based coordinate system for reasons of history and convenience. But there are plenty of good observations which indicate that geocentrism is not the true state of affairs in the cosmos. Maintaining scientific geocentrism is possible only if we dispense with nearly every well-established physical principle: gravitation, force, mass, dynamics, energy, not to mention the other basic observations which validate heliocentrism (within the solar system) such as rotational dynamics, centre of mass, stellar parallax, Coriolis force (with its Foucault pendulum, counter-clockwise rotation of storms in the Northern hemisphere), nuclear fusion, neutrino oscillation, extra-solar planetary systems, seasonal anisotropy of the cosmic microwave background, etc., etc. Of course, one could be a philosophical antirealist, or fictionalist, and maintain that these are only appearances or useful constructs, but we have discussed – and will continue to do so, Lord willing – the problems of such a position in Reformed epistemology and ontology, with, in my view, the critical (or, as Broussard puts it, humble) realist position doing more justice to the reality of the creation and to God’s gift of rationality to His image bearers. My main point regarding reference frames is that Scripture’s speaking from the point of view of earth is not scientifically problematic, but neither is it a scientific claim any more than is our continued reference to such geocentric notions as sunsets.
Also, let me briefly unveil the Copernican myth to which van der Kamp and nearly everyone else has succumbed. This is the idea that Copernicus in proposing a heliocentric system dethroned the earth from its position at the Centre of the cosmos, and that this is a threat to the Scriptural idea that humanity is central in God’s plan of salvation. Having once been considered at the Centre, the earth is now relegated to being just one planet among many, and further developments put us orbiting around just one star out of many, in one galaxy among many, etc. However, it is important to note that according to the Greeks, the earth is evil, with hell being at its centre and the heavens being the place of perfection. Thus, far from demoting the earth, Copernicus actually exalted it to join the heavenly realms! This is discussed in Dennis Danielson, “The Great Copernican Cliché”, American Journal of Physics, v. 69, n. 10 (Oct. 2001), pp. 1029-35. Danielson is a member of a Reformed church, and an English professor at UBC studying historical literature on the cosmos, writing here in a physics journal, and so if you can obtain the article via your university or college library, all readers of this blog should find it accessible. In fact, modern astronomy suggests that not only is the earth not at the center, but that there is no centre, much like how there is no location on the surface of the earth which could rightfully claim such an honour; I consider this to be a superb poetical analogy of how once Jews claimed they had to worship in Jerusalem, but now God’s people worship anywhere in spirit and truth (see John 4:20-24).
Incidentally, earth’s placement, environment, and attributes remain particularly special in many ways; see Guillermo Gonzalez & Jay Wesley Richards, The Privileged Planet: How Our Place in the Cosmos Is Designed for Discovery (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2004) and Peter D. Ward & Donald Brown, Rare Earth: Why Complex Life is Uncommon in the Universe (New York: Copernicus Books, 2004).
My conclusion is that scientific geocentrism is neither taught in nor implied by Scripture, and there is every reason for the Christian to acknowledge the weight of evidence against it while no reason to suppose that this means earth and humanity is any less special in God’s eyes. After all, we are created in God’s image, and the incarnation, atonement, and resurrection took place on our home planet. And we can say with even more depth of understanding, in humility and awe, with David, “When I consider your heavens, …what is man that you are mindful of him…?” (Psalm 8.3-4, NIV)
“no physicist I know says that the earth in any absolute sense travels around the sun. Science today does not claim that there is an absolute reference frame in which the earth is moving.”
This is apparently the best thing any Ph.D. physicist has said which could be construed to be in favour of geocentrism, at least in terms of “reference frames”. (Unfortunately, I can no longer find my other comments from that discussion.) Einstein’s theory of general relativity allows one to show how measurements of space and time correspond between references frames which are moving (in fact accelerating) relative to one another, and eschews the concept of an absolute point or system of reference from which space and time ought to be measured. However, one should not assume that the instrumentalist view is implied by general relativity, or that geocentrism is thusly made tenable. In astronomy, one does indeed usually employ an earth-based coordinate system for reasons of history and convenience. But there are plenty of good observations which indicate that geocentrism is not the true state of affairs in the cosmos. Maintaining scientific geocentrism is possible only if we dispense with nearly every well-established physical principle: gravitation, force, mass, dynamics, energy, not to mention the other basic observations which validate heliocentrism (within the solar system) such as rotational dynamics, centre of mass, stellar parallax, Coriolis force (with its Foucault pendulum, counter-clockwise rotation of storms in the Northern hemisphere), nuclear fusion, neutrino oscillation, extra-solar planetary systems, seasonal anisotropy of the cosmic microwave background, etc., etc. Of course, one could be a philosophical antirealist, or fictionalist, and maintain that these are only appearances or useful constructs, but we have discussed – and will continue to do so, Lord willing – the problems of such a position in Reformed epistemology and ontology, with, in my view, the critical (or, as Broussard puts it, humble) realist position doing more justice to the reality of the creation and to God’s gift of rationality to His image bearers. My main point regarding reference frames is that Scripture’s speaking from the point of view of earth is not scientifically problematic, but neither is it a scientific claim any more than is our continued reference to such geocentric notions as sunsets.
Also, let me briefly unveil the Copernican myth to which van der Kamp and nearly everyone else has succumbed. This is the idea that Copernicus in proposing a heliocentric system dethroned the earth from its position at the Centre of the cosmos, and that this is a threat to the Scriptural idea that humanity is central in God’s plan of salvation. Having once been considered at the Centre, the earth is now relegated to being just one planet among many, and further developments put us orbiting around just one star out of many, in one galaxy among many, etc. However, it is important to note that according to the Greeks, the earth is evil, with hell being at its centre and the heavens being the place of perfection. Thus, far from demoting the earth, Copernicus actually exalted it to join the heavenly realms! This is discussed in Dennis Danielson, “The Great Copernican Cliché”, American Journal of Physics, v. 69, n. 10 (Oct. 2001), pp. 1029-35. Danielson is a member of a Reformed church, and an English professor at UBC studying historical literature on the cosmos, writing here in a physics journal, and so if you can obtain the article via your university or college library, all readers of this blog should find it accessible. In fact, modern astronomy suggests that not only is the earth not at the center, but that there is no centre, much like how there is no location on the surface of the earth which could rightfully claim such an honour; I consider this to be a superb poetical analogy of how once Jews claimed they had to worship in Jerusalem, but now God’s people worship anywhere in spirit and truth (see John 4:20-24).
Incidentally, earth’s placement, environment, and attributes remain particularly special in many ways; see Guillermo Gonzalez & Jay Wesley Richards, The Privileged Planet: How Our Place in the Cosmos Is Designed for Discovery (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2004) and Peter D. Ward & Donald Brown, Rare Earth: Why Complex Life is Uncommon in the Universe (New York: Copernicus Books, 2004).
My conclusion is that scientific geocentrism is neither taught in nor implied by Scripture, and there is every reason for the Christian to acknowledge the weight of evidence against it while no reason to suppose that this means earth and humanity is any less special in God’s eyes. After all, we are created in God’s image, and the incarnation, atonement, and resurrection took place on our home planet. And we can say with even more depth of understanding, in humility and awe, with David, “When I consider your heavens, …what is man that you are mindful of him…?” (Psalm 8.3-4, NIV)
Monday, May 25, 2009
Humble Realism and Reformed Hermeneutics
Below follows a guest post by Ben Faber (B.A., McMaster; D.Phil., Oxford), who teaches Renaissance and 18th-century English literature at Redeemer University College in Ancaster, Ontario. He and his wife, Rita, with their five children, are members of Cornerstone Canadian Reformed Church in Hamilton. We thank Ben for his contribution, and welcome the engagement of our readers.
In a comment on a previous entry, I noted three points of intersection between Phillip Broussard’s “Humble Realism” and a Reformed approach to hermeneutics. This is an elaboration on these connections.
“Hermeneutics” is the term used in theological, philosophical and literary contexts to “clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place” (Hans-Georg Gadamer). As such, “hermeneutics” usually refers to the assumptions which undergird the theories of interpretation that drive various practices of textual analysis—assumptions about language, reality, agency, perception, and so forth. Conflicting interpretations of Biblical or literary texts can often be traced back to the assumptions that constitute the hermeneutic behind the differing readings. One can go even further back, of course, to the worldview in which the hermeneutic arises that shapes the theory governing the practice. In the following comments I will focus on language since the nature of language continues to be the pivotal issue in hermeneutics. For further reading on these and other aspects of hermeneutics, I highly recommend Kevin Vanhoozer’s Is There a Meaning in this Text? (Zondervan, 1998).
So how does a Reformed hermeneutic align in key areas with a Reformed approach to science as expressed by Dr. Broussard?
(A) Realist ontology: When Augustine in On Christian Doctrine refers to the correspondence between the two books of God’s self-revelation, he is suggesting that this correspondence also relates to the means by which God reveals Himself in world and Word. Creation declares the glory of God by natural signs (things); Scripture declares the glory of God by artificial, or conventional, signs (words). In a general sense, although artificial or conventional signs may be secondary to natural signs, they nevertheless refer to real objects, actions, states of being, observable and nonobservable phenomena, etc. Language is representative of the reality to which it refers. Radical poststructuralist literary theory, which absolutizes Derrida’s famous expression that “there is nothing outside the text”, argues that the “reality” to which language refers is inaccessible as such because it is always mediated by language itself: we cannot step outside of discourse to apprehend reality in a pure, unadulterated form. In fact, the postmodernist would add, this “reality” is not given but constructed. A Reformed literary hermeneutic responds by saying that the fact that our apprehension of reality is mediated by language does not negate the reality of that “reality”. That aspects of our understanding of reality are constructed from our being situated in time and place also does not negate that reality. The classical realist position in the sciences is similar to an unproblematic view of language (modernist), while the antirealist position sounds like an excessively bleak take on language (postmodernist). Broussard’s “Humble Realism” echoes the Reformed view that language makes reality accessible, expressible and apprehensible.
(B) Humble epistemology: For all its wonderful properties as a means of making this reality accessible, however, language is neither a neutral instrument nor a perfect vehicle. The good gifts with which God endowed Adam and Eve, including language, were desecrated by the fall into sin. The finitude of human understanding, together with the effects of sin on that understanding, leaves us with no alternative but to acknowledge that the analogy between language and truth is often shaky and fraught with uncertainty. Nevertheless, even while a Reformed hermeneutic recognizes the effects of sin on language, incarnation and inscripturation both point to the real possibility of a correspondence between language and truth. Postmodernist views of language suggest that we are always already caught helplessly between incommensurability and plenitude. In response, the Reformed view of language suggests that we have reasonable grounds to trust language as an analogy of reality, yet without making claims for its absolute reliability. For that we will have to wait for the return of our ascended Lord to complete the redemption of Babel that He began at Pentecost.
(C) Image-of-God anthropology: The covenantal character of the triune God is one of the key themes of Reformed theology, especially as this is expressed in the doctrines concerning the triune Godhead, creation, election, revelation, sacraments, etc. As Nicholas Wolterstorff has suggested, true human flourishing takes place when one lives in peace with God, neighbour, environment, and self. Human beings are fundamentally relational creatures—what Reformed Christians might prefer to call “covenantal creatures” to emphasize the spiritual and ethical responsibilities that accompany our relationality. Language, too, as a means of communication is intrinsically covenantal in its exchange of promise and obligation. As Ludwig Wittgenstein observed, there is no such thing as private language. Therefore, without diminishing the importance of other aspects of being made in God’s image (see Heidelberg Catechism, Lord’s Day 3; Belgic Confession, Art. 14), a Reformed literary hermeneutic would highlight the covenantal elements of speech acts in relation to imago Dei. Kevin Vanhoozer, James Smith and Anthony Thiselton do precisely this in emphasizing trust, obligation and responsiveness as the conditions of language-use.
While the foregoing observations relate to general hermeneutics, the implications for special hermeneutics are intriguing. For instance, the idea of the covenant of language portrays our mundane actions of giving and receiving meaning as an exchange grounded in trust, obligation and responsiveness. When something profoundly characteristic of the triune God (His covenantal relationships) is also intrinsic to the ordinary means (language) by which God reveals Himself, surely something significant is going on. Given the covenantal structure of language, how does the fact that God spoke creation into being affect our relationship with the natural world? What does this mean for our understanding of John 1, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”? Is the covenantal structure of language merely a coincidental and convenient analogy for the covenantal nature of the Bible with its promise and obligation? Or does the covenantal structure of language derive from God Himself, not as an accident, but as a corollary to the nature of His creation (ontology) and as a function of our being made in His image (anthropology)? How does the covenant of language relate to the language of covenant? Perhaps a general Reformed hermeneutic may have something to contribute to our understanding of the covenantal nature of God’s revelation in His Word and world. And of preaching, prayer, praise, profession of faith, and a whole host of other covenantal acts of language in our lives as people of the Book.
Some References
James K.A. Smith, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational Hermeneutic. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000.
Anthony Thiselton, Thiselton on Hermeneutics: Collected Works and New Essays. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008.
Kevin Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text? The Bible, The Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998.
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984.
In a comment on a previous entry, I noted three points of intersection between Phillip Broussard’s “Humble Realism” and a Reformed approach to hermeneutics. This is an elaboration on these connections.
“Hermeneutics” is the term used in theological, philosophical and literary contexts to “clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place” (Hans-Georg Gadamer). As such, “hermeneutics” usually refers to the assumptions which undergird the theories of interpretation that drive various practices of textual analysis—assumptions about language, reality, agency, perception, and so forth. Conflicting interpretations of Biblical or literary texts can often be traced back to the assumptions that constitute the hermeneutic behind the differing readings. One can go even further back, of course, to the worldview in which the hermeneutic arises that shapes the theory governing the practice. In the following comments I will focus on language since the nature of language continues to be the pivotal issue in hermeneutics. For further reading on these and other aspects of hermeneutics, I highly recommend Kevin Vanhoozer’s Is There a Meaning in this Text? (Zondervan, 1998).
So how does a Reformed hermeneutic align in key areas with a Reformed approach to science as expressed by Dr. Broussard?
(A) Realist ontology: When Augustine in On Christian Doctrine refers to the correspondence between the two books of God’s self-revelation, he is suggesting that this correspondence also relates to the means by which God reveals Himself in world and Word. Creation declares the glory of God by natural signs (things); Scripture declares the glory of God by artificial, or conventional, signs (words). In a general sense, although artificial or conventional signs may be secondary to natural signs, they nevertheless refer to real objects, actions, states of being, observable and nonobservable phenomena, etc. Language is representative of the reality to which it refers. Radical poststructuralist literary theory, which absolutizes Derrida’s famous expression that “there is nothing outside the text”, argues that the “reality” to which language refers is inaccessible as such because it is always mediated by language itself: we cannot step outside of discourse to apprehend reality in a pure, unadulterated form. In fact, the postmodernist would add, this “reality” is not given but constructed. A Reformed literary hermeneutic responds by saying that the fact that our apprehension of reality is mediated by language does not negate the reality of that “reality”. That aspects of our understanding of reality are constructed from our being situated in time and place also does not negate that reality. The classical realist position in the sciences is similar to an unproblematic view of language (modernist), while the antirealist position sounds like an excessively bleak take on language (postmodernist). Broussard’s “Humble Realism” echoes the Reformed view that language makes reality accessible, expressible and apprehensible.
(B) Humble epistemology: For all its wonderful properties as a means of making this reality accessible, however, language is neither a neutral instrument nor a perfect vehicle. The good gifts with which God endowed Adam and Eve, including language, were desecrated by the fall into sin. The finitude of human understanding, together with the effects of sin on that understanding, leaves us with no alternative but to acknowledge that the analogy between language and truth is often shaky and fraught with uncertainty. Nevertheless, even while a Reformed hermeneutic recognizes the effects of sin on language, incarnation and inscripturation both point to the real possibility of a correspondence between language and truth. Postmodernist views of language suggest that we are always already caught helplessly between incommensurability and plenitude. In response, the Reformed view of language suggests that we have reasonable grounds to trust language as an analogy of reality, yet without making claims for its absolute reliability. For that we will have to wait for the return of our ascended Lord to complete the redemption of Babel that He began at Pentecost.
(C) Image-of-God anthropology: The covenantal character of the triune God is one of the key themes of Reformed theology, especially as this is expressed in the doctrines concerning the triune Godhead, creation, election, revelation, sacraments, etc. As Nicholas Wolterstorff has suggested, true human flourishing takes place when one lives in peace with God, neighbour, environment, and self. Human beings are fundamentally relational creatures—what Reformed Christians might prefer to call “covenantal creatures” to emphasize the spiritual and ethical responsibilities that accompany our relationality. Language, too, as a means of communication is intrinsically covenantal in its exchange of promise and obligation. As Ludwig Wittgenstein observed, there is no such thing as private language. Therefore, without diminishing the importance of other aspects of being made in God’s image (see Heidelberg Catechism, Lord’s Day 3; Belgic Confession, Art. 14), a Reformed literary hermeneutic would highlight the covenantal elements of speech acts in relation to imago Dei. Kevin Vanhoozer, James Smith and Anthony Thiselton do precisely this in emphasizing trust, obligation and responsiveness as the conditions of language-use.
While the foregoing observations relate to general hermeneutics, the implications for special hermeneutics are intriguing. For instance, the idea of the covenant of language portrays our mundane actions of giving and receiving meaning as an exchange grounded in trust, obligation and responsiveness. When something profoundly characteristic of the triune God (His covenantal relationships) is also intrinsic to the ordinary means (language) by which God reveals Himself, surely something significant is going on. Given the covenantal structure of language, how does the fact that God spoke creation into being affect our relationship with the natural world? What does this mean for our understanding of John 1, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God”? Is the covenantal structure of language merely a coincidental and convenient analogy for the covenantal nature of the Bible with its promise and obligation? Or does the covenantal structure of language derive from God Himself, not as an accident, but as a corollary to the nature of His creation (ontology) and as a function of our being made in His image (anthropology)? How does the covenant of language relate to the language of covenant? Perhaps a general Reformed hermeneutic may have something to contribute to our understanding of the covenantal nature of God’s revelation in His Word and world. And of preaching, prayer, praise, profession of faith, and a whole host of other covenantal acts of language in our lives as people of the Book.
Some References
James K.A. Smith, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational Hermeneutic. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000.
Anthony Thiselton, Thiselton on Hermeneutics: Collected Works and New Essays. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008.
Kevin Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text? The Bible, The Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998.
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984.
Michael Polanyi on Humble Realism
Phillip Broussard’s work on scientific knowing (see Arnold’s post) is enlightening, as is his belief that the truth of our being created in the image of God “has something to do with how we can be stewards of this creation” and with our ability to achieve a limited understanding of God’s faithfulness in creation. His articles, and especially his description of “humble realism,” contain antidotes not only to naïve-realist and anti-realist interpretations in science but are applicable in a wider area. They shed light, for example, on the conflict between modernist objectivism (naïve realism) on the one hand and postmodernist subjective relativism (anti-realism) on the other. I focus on that wider context.
Among the philosophers who have dealt at some length with the errors of an anti-realist position is Michael Polanyi (1891-1976). Of interest in this connection are his arguments against “cultural conditioning” – the doctrine that we hold our beliefs and convictions merely because of the culture in which we live, and that therefore they are altogether relative. Polanyi does not deny the role of cultural influences but argues that, rather than interfering with the accumulation of knowledge, they are in fact essential for our mental development. “An entirely untutored maturing of the mind would…result in a state of imbecility” (Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 295). We can function as intelligent human beings only because we are part of the community, historical epoch, and civilization wherein we find ourselves. “Tacit assent and intellectual passions,” he writes, “the sharing of an idiom and of a cultural heritage, affiliation to a like-minded community: such are the impulses which shape our vision of the nature of things on which we rely for our mastery of things. No intelligence, however critical or original, can operate outside such a fiduciary framework” (Ibid., p. 266).
Polanyi at the same time warns that our cultural rootedness does not deprive us of our personal responsibility. Not only are we obliged to test the traditions we inherit, we are also able to do so. Although influenced by our culture, we do not have to be its passive recipients; everyone has “some measure of direct access to the standards of truth and rightness” (Polanyi, The Study of Man, p. 30). It is true that that access is limited. The criteria by which we test the traditions of our culture depend on that same culture, so that a truly objective view of things is denied us. But does this not mean that we are the helpless victims of our environment after all? Polanyi rejects that conclusion while stressing our human limitations, which he sees as imposed by our finitude. We have no choice but to accept these limitations, since it is impossible to hold ourselves responsible beyond them. Asking how we would think if we had been raised outside a particular society is as meaningless as asking how we would think if we had been born in no particular body. “I believe, therefore,” he concludes, “that as I am called upon to live and die in this body, struggling to satisfy its desires, recording my impressions by aid of such sense organs as it is equipped with, and acting through the puny machinery of my brain, my nerves and my muscles, so I am called upon also to acquire the instruments of intelligence from my early surroundings and to use these particular instruments to fulfill the universal obligations to which I am subject” (Pers. Knowl., p. 323). Epistemic humility is required, but postmodernist agnosticism is out of the question.
Polanyi does not say it is God who called us, placed us in a particular time and culture, and assigned to us our cultural tasks. He also does not he speak of our being created in the image of God, nor does he say in so many words that our (limited) knowledge of reality is God’s gift of grace – although he seems to admit, at least by implication, human dependence. Even so, Christian believers can take to heart his “humble realism” together with his argued rejection of the doctrine of absolute social conditioning. Polanyi was not a Christian. But perhaps we may see in his philosophy the influence of what Broussard calls God’s common grace.
Among the philosophers who have dealt at some length with the errors of an anti-realist position is Michael Polanyi (1891-1976). Of interest in this connection are his arguments against “cultural conditioning” – the doctrine that we hold our beliefs and convictions merely because of the culture in which we live, and that therefore they are altogether relative. Polanyi does not deny the role of cultural influences but argues that, rather than interfering with the accumulation of knowledge, they are in fact essential for our mental development. “An entirely untutored maturing of the mind would…result in a state of imbecility” (Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 295). We can function as intelligent human beings only because we are part of the community, historical epoch, and civilization wherein we find ourselves. “Tacit assent and intellectual passions,” he writes, “the sharing of an idiom and of a cultural heritage, affiliation to a like-minded community: such are the impulses which shape our vision of the nature of things on which we rely for our mastery of things. No intelligence, however critical or original, can operate outside such a fiduciary framework” (Ibid., p. 266).
Polanyi at the same time warns that our cultural rootedness does not deprive us of our personal responsibility. Not only are we obliged to test the traditions we inherit, we are also able to do so. Although influenced by our culture, we do not have to be its passive recipients; everyone has “some measure of direct access to the standards of truth and rightness” (Polanyi, The Study of Man, p. 30). It is true that that access is limited. The criteria by which we test the traditions of our culture depend on that same culture, so that a truly objective view of things is denied us. But does this not mean that we are the helpless victims of our environment after all? Polanyi rejects that conclusion while stressing our human limitations, which he sees as imposed by our finitude. We have no choice but to accept these limitations, since it is impossible to hold ourselves responsible beyond them. Asking how we would think if we had been raised outside a particular society is as meaningless as asking how we would think if we had been born in no particular body. “I believe, therefore,” he concludes, “that as I am called upon to live and die in this body, struggling to satisfy its desires, recording my impressions by aid of such sense organs as it is equipped with, and acting through the puny machinery of my brain, my nerves and my muscles, so I am called upon also to acquire the instruments of intelligence from my early surroundings and to use these particular instruments to fulfill the universal obligations to which I am subject” (Pers. Knowl., p. 323). Epistemic humility is required, but postmodernist agnosticism is out of the question.
Polanyi does not say it is God who called us, placed us in a particular time and culture, and assigned to us our cultural tasks. He also does not he speak of our being created in the image of God, nor does he say in so many words that our (limited) knowledge of reality is God’s gift of grace – although he seems to admit, at least by implication, human dependence. Even so, Christian believers can take to heart his “humble realism” together with his argued rejection of the doctrine of absolute social conditioning. Polanyi was not a Christian. But perhaps we may see in his philosophy the influence of what Broussard calls God’s common grace.
Monday, May 11, 2009
Replacing Fictionalism and Antirealism with Humble Realism
Do the entities found in our scientific theories exist in the real world, or are theories simply tools used to give us a helpful but ultimately false handle on our experience of the world?
My friend and colleague Phillip Broussard at Covenant College (the undergraduate liberal-arts college of the Presbyterian Church in America, a Reformed denomination which together with the CanRC is in NAPARC) wrote a couple of papers which are relevant to our discussions here regarding the age of the earth. I encourage you to read these, and make your comments here.
He argues against what he calls a fictionalist view of scientific theories, an example of scientific antirealism, a view which suggests that there is little if any connection between the theories used in science and the created reality, and affirms the approach of critical realism, moving it forward into a Reformed Christian perspective he calls humble realism. He describes and critiques fictionalist views which show up in the creation science community and in his students, along the lines of ‘appearance of age’.
The papers are entitled “A Reformed View of Fictionalism and Antirealism in the Sciences” (2003, PDF here) and “Is Realism Viable in the Midst of Physics and Philosophy?” (2008, PDF here). These were written in the context of Broussard’s tenure review process at Covenant, and while they contain some “in-house” references (particularly in the first paper), such as to lectures by his colleagues, he brings up points which are valuable for us all to consider.
Here is a lengthy quote from pp. 27f. of the second paper, which you would need to read in its entirety to fully appreciate. It does contain some wonderful technical detail for the physicists among us, but is certainly possible to comprehend without a physics background.
“Humble Realism does not accept the tenets of antirealism, in saying that theories have no connection to reality, nor would it accept a classical realist view that the objects must be consistent with our scale chauvinistic views or that if a theory is successful then it is True. Humble Realism would first of all see that the goal of science as glorifying God and enabling us to be better stewards of His creation. In order to do that, Humble Realism would see science as attempting to discover truth about the nature of reality, but is aware that a complete understanding of even a limited part of reality is going to be beyond us. The entities and laws postulated by theories are assumed to be accurate, yet incomplete, approximations to what is present in the theory-independent world, but the mental model of those images must be informed by the problems of scale chauvinism we all struggle with. Humble Realism embraces the view of humans as limited and fallen creatures, who realize that our finitude is a gift from God, all the time acknowledging that the truth of Imago Dei has something to do with how we can be stewards of this creation, including the ability to grasp a limited understanding of God’s faithfulness in creation. Humble Realism acknowledges that past theories, although shown to be incomplete and false in some ways, can still be used as well as seeing that these theories do seem to arise from more accurate theories. Humble Realism cannot do a better job on quantifying verisimilitude than the many philosophers who have tried, but it can acknowledge that we often do distinguish between competing theories and can tell which does a better job. Humble Realism must take full ownership that the issues of confirmation cannot be fully solved, and as such can never claim absolute confidence in any theory, however, as a theory is more and more successful, we can have more confidence that it applies to reality in a limited manner. Humble Realism acknowledges that it is only because of a faithful God that one can understand some aspect of reality in a limited way and that all the knowledge we have is revelation from the one who holds all things together (Colossians 1:18) Finally, Humble Realism will hopefully allow one to take joy in what we learn about God’s creation.”
I’m looking forward to a fruitful discussion among readers of Broussard’s papers. When responding, please refer to page numbers and make sure we can tell which paper you’re referring to (first paper, 2003; second paper, 2008).
My friend and colleague Phillip Broussard at Covenant College (the undergraduate liberal-arts college of the Presbyterian Church in America, a Reformed denomination which together with the CanRC is in NAPARC) wrote a couple of papers which are relevant to our discussions here regarding the age of the earth. I encourage you to read these, and make your comments here.
He argues against what he calls a fictionalist view of scientific theories, an example of scientific antirealism, a view which suggests that there is little if any connection between the theories used in science and the created reality, and affirms the approach of critical realism, moving it forward into a Reformed Christian perspective he calls humble realism. He describes and critiques fictionalist views which show up in the creation science community and in his students, along the lines of ‘appearance of age’.
The papers are entitled “A Reformed View of Fictionalism and Antirealism in the Sciences” (2003, PDF here) and “Is Realism Viable in the Midst of Physics and Philosophy?” (2008, PDF here). These were written in the context of Broussard’s tenure review process at Covenant, and while they contain some “in-house” references (particularly in the first paper), such as to lectures by his colleagues, he brings up points which are valuable for us all to consider.
Here is a lengthy quote from pp. 27f. of the second paper, which you would need to read in its entirety to fully appreciate. It does contain some wonderful technical detail for the physicists among us, but is certainly possible to comprehend without a physics background.
“Humble Realism does not accept the tenets of antirealism, in saying that theories have no connection to reality, nor would it accept a classical realist view that the objects must be consistent with our scale chauvinistic views or that if a theory is successful then it is True. Humble Realism would first of all see that the goal of science as glorifying God and enabling us to be better stewards of His creation. In order to do that, Humble Realism would see science as attempting to discover truth about the nature of reality, but is aware that a complete understanding of even a limited part of reality is going to be beyond us. The entities and laws postulated by theories are assumed to be accurate, yet incomplete, approximations to what is present in the theory-independent world, but the mental model of those images must be informed by the problems of scale chauvinism we all struggle with. Humble Realism embraces the view of humans as limited and fallen creatures, who realize that our finitude is a gift from God, all the time acknowledging that the truth of Imago Dei has something to do with how we can be stewards of this creation, including the ability to grasp a limited understanding of God’s faithfulness in creation. Humble Realism acknowledges that past theories, although shown to be incomplete and false in some ways, can still be used as well as seeing that these theories do seem to arise from more accurate theories. Humble Realism cannot do a better job on quantifying verisimilitude than the many philosophers who have tried, but it can acknowledge that we often do distinguish between competing theories and can tell which does a better job. Humble Realism must take full ownership that the issues of confirmation cannot be fully solved, and as such can never claim absolute confidence in any theory, however, as a theory is more and more successful, we can have more confidence that it applies to reality in a limited manner. Humble Realism acknowledges that it is only because of a faithful God that one can understand some aspect of reality in a limited way and that all the knowledge we have is revelation from the one who holds all things together (Colossians 1:18) Finally, Humble Realism will hopefully allow one to take joy in what we learn about God’s creation.”
I’m looking forward to a fruitful discussion among readers of Broussard’s papers. When responding, please refer to page numbers and make sure we can tell which paper you’re referring to (first paper, 2003; second paper, 2008).
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