In their 1987 book entitled Origin Science, Norman Geisler and Kerby Anderson introduced a distinction between ‘operation science’ and ‘origin science’. They argued that operation or empirical science handles regular events while origin or historical science deals with singular events.
This is the distinction that Dr. John Byl relies on when in a recent post he highlights the subjectivity of research into the past as opposed to the objectivity of research into the present. Dr. Byl writes: “The central point of my book was that scientific theory--particularly in origin (or historical) science--is highly subjective and driven by worldview considerations. A Christian epistemology should thus give prime weight to Scripture, logic and observation. Scientific theories, on the other hand, are fallible human constructs that should be evaluated in the light of the former.” Further, “The science used to build airplanes is of a rather different nature than the claim that man evolved from apes. To wit, we must distinguish between operation science and historical science:”
Dr. Byl rejects origin science because it is stained by the subjectivity of worldview influences. The status of operation science is left unclear. Operation science is also fallible. Nevertheless it is placed beside Scripture as far more reliable than origin science. However that may be, he recommends, the better approach is to rely on Scripture, logic and observation. I have divided the problems with this approach into three groups. In Part A I argue that operation science is not a safe haven because it is as subjective as origin science. So why should one trust operation science? In Part B I will offer reasons for its trustworthiness. But this trustworthiness is not without limits. Part C concludes with some thoughts about the role of Scripture.
Part A: The subjectivity of operation science
The distinction between research into the past and that into the present is one of degree, not of kind. Beginning with Hume, philosophers of science have acknowledged that scientific investigation of current events relies on past experience. This is known as the problem of induction. This simply means that human experience is limited in principle and that scientific knowledge has no absolute certainty. This holds for both origin and operation science.
Observations in science can be classified into two groups – those predicted by theory and those made accidentally. Both types of observation are subjective because they are always seen in terms of what one already knows whether that is a theory or a worldview. I will deal with theory-guided observation below and focus here on the role of worldview. We can take the perception of pendulum movement in the Aristotelian and Galilean worldviews as an example from physics. The world according to Aristotle consists of earth, water, air and fire. A body falls according to the proportion of earth it contains because earth has the natural tendency to move down as opposed to fire which moves up. Thus the pendulum movement of a rock at the end of a rope is seen as falling with difficulty. In contrast, the late medieval philosopher-bishop Nicolas Oresme described the pendulum motion of the rock in terms of a force implanted in the rock by the person who gives it a swing (the ‘impetus’). Galileo adopted this view and saw a body that almost succeeded in repeating the same pendulum motion. This led him to see other properties of the pendulum on the basis of which he developed the law of independence of weight and rate of fall as well as the law of the relationship between vertical height and terminal velocity of motions down inclined planes.
The theory of continental drift is a good example. Before its introduction by Wegener in 1912 geologists worked within a paradigm in which the continents were static. The anomalous observation was that the outlines of S. America and Africa matched like pieces in a puzzle. Moreover, the continents shared identical strata with identical fossils in them. These observations also applied to other continents. But there were no known forces that could move these continents apart. Geologists suspended judgment or rejected Wegener’s theory until the 1960s when new observations tipped the balance in his favour. For details, see this website.
Rejecting a theory or a paradigm may block research. Hence the second and third response to an anomalous observation. These responses occur because theory guides observation. It does so because a theory logically contains observation statements. These are the observations predicted by the theory. Such observations are logically inferred from the theory. When actual observations differ from the predicted one, the theory is rejected. Otherwise the theory is submitted to more tests. For example:
- Theory: All cats have five legs
- Deduction: My cat has five legs
- Observation: My cat has four legs
- Conclusion: Not all cats have five legs (rejected theory)
If my cat had five legs, then the theory would be considered acceptable. This means that for any given theory a large collection of potential observations remains out of sight because they are not logically implied by the theory. No one is going to count legs in horses. A theory is like a search light – it reveals a small circumscribed area and leaves the rest in the dark. There is no logical cure for this incompleteness because this is the nature of science both of the past and of the present. The need for observations to be relevant for a theory means that they are theory-laden. Observations are also worldview-laden as mentioned above.
Byl’s cursory mention of logic is unhelpful as it stands. If he means inductive logic, then he must remember Popper’s point that one cannot move logically from an observation to an observation statement since the former is a psychological event while the latter is a logical entity. If he were to disagree with Popper, his next problem would be that the conclusions will depend crucially on whether the observations were correct and complete. The role of theory just indicated virtually guarantees that the observations are incomplete. On the other hand, if Byl is referring to deductive logic the conclusions depend on whether the premises are correct and that in turn depends again on the completeness of the observations on which the premise is based.
Part B: The trustworthiness of origin science
The explanation of singular events in the past relies as much on regularities as the explanation of singular as well as regular events in the present. This is the point of forensic science mentioned in Sikkema’s blog post. Forensic entomology studies the insects and other bugs found in corpses, the sequence in which they appear, the kinds of insects, and the stage in their life cycle in which they are found are clues that suggest the time of death, the length of a corpse’s exposure, and whether the corpse was moved. In a murder case, for instance, the time of death can be estimated by determining the stage of development of insect larvae deposited on the body, the known rate of their development and the temperature. A critique consistent with scientific creationists’ rejection of radiometric dating would be that forensic scientists assume the constancy of the rate of development of insects. The equivalent critique of radiometric dating by young earth creationists is that the rates of radioactive decay are not constant. But such assumptions are always checked by using independent lines of evidence. In our forensic example such checks would include the last time a phone call was made or the victim was seen in the bank. In the case of radiometric dating the so-called whole rock method neutralizes assumptions about initial quantities of isotopes. The independent lines of evidence come from isotope ratios measured in different samples of a whole body of rock – hence the name. Independent lines of evidence increase the confidence one has in the correctness of the reconstruction of the past because the different lines of evidence cannot be accounted for as the result of a single common cause. The more independent lines of evidence the less likely it is that they accidentally converge on the same conclusion.
The same applies to reconstructions of the history of life on earth. For instance, the evolution of fruit flies on the Hawaiian Islands has been reconstructed using chromosome mutations. The relative age of the islands has been determined by radiometric dating. The sequence of their formation by volcanic action has been established on the basis of the North-Western movement of the continental plate of which they are part. Chromosome mutations, radiometric dating and continental drift are mutually independent lines of evidence. They are also independent of any evolutionary paradigm. They all converge on the same reconstruction of the history of fruit fly evolution. For more on this example and on independent lines of evidence, see van der Meer, J.M. “Ideology and Science”, Reformed Academic, 16 August 2010 (links: full paper & introductory blog post).
According to Dr. Byl, “Operational science calculates forward, deducing effects from causes, whereas historical science calculates backwards, inferring past causes from present clues. One problem here is that more than one possible historical cause can give rise to the same effect.” This, however, is also a difference of degree, not of kind. In operation science, experiments aimed at changing the rate of movement of tectonic plates are as much beyond human possibilities as experiments in the past. Nevertheless, predictions are possible. This also applies to the history of pouched mammals (marsupials) mentioned by Sikkema. In that light Byl’s distinction between forward and backward prediction carries little weight in preferring ‘operation science’ over ‘origin science’. Moreover, in operation science there are an unlimited number of theories that can account for a set of observations just like in origin science more than one possible cause can produce the same effect.
In conclusion, Dr. Byl is incorrect in singling out origin science for its subjectivity. Operation science is just as subjective. This conclusion has earned Thomas Kuhn the reputation of being a relativist. The response of Feyerabend was to throw up his hands and say anything goes. Still others such as scientific creationists have taken this as a licence to build a science with what they call a Christian content. These responses must be rejected from a Christian point of view. Here the doctrine of creation is essential. I believe that God created a reality that exists independent of human cognition. This means that we have the religious duty to try to eliminate the role of worldviews that direct us away from knowledge of this objectively existing reality. This is how a central theme in Scripture can shape science at the worldview level. It is worthwhile to put this conclusion in a wider perspective. There are two traditions in the interpretation of the Book of Scripture. In the biblicistic tradition the Bible plays a direct role. Texts are used out of context as source of scientific information about nature (geocentricity, Scriptural geology). In the perspectival tradition, on the other hand, the Bible serves indirectly by providing a general view or perspective on nature (nature as purposive, as contingent, as existing objectively). I recommend the latter because it does not fall into the mistake of treating Scripture texts as if they were intended to give information about nature that satisfies the standards of science.
Part C: Scripture and science
In recommending the use of Scripture in historical science Dr. Byl overlooks the fact that the interpretation of Scripture suffers as much from subjectivity as science does. After all, subjectivity is a human characteristic. This may be seen in those cases where a faulty interpretation of Scripture shaped scientific understanding. In the history of biogeography, the belief that Noah’s flood was global was taken to imply that plants and animals had spread from a single centre on mount Ararat. This was used to account for their spread across the globe. But the facts could not be accounted for and so the information taken from Scripture was abandoned. Further, there was a theological debate in the sixteenth century about the incarnation, the details of which are beyond the scope of this article. But in that debate the anabaptist Menno Simons took the literalist position “that Levi was still in the loins of his father Abraham when Melchisedec came to meet him (Hebrews 7:10) as an indication that the father is the true origin of the child. The same point he found demonstrated in II Samuel 7:12, where David was told by God, ‘I will raise up your offspring after you, who shall come forth from your body.’” We now know that the father is not the sole origin of a child. In the history of geology, Neptunism – the school that tried to explain the features of the earth in terms of the action of water – was inspired by the story of Noah’s Flood. Despite far-fetched attempts by flood geologists no evidence for a global flood has been found.
Contemporary scientific creationism provides more examples. Dr. Byl writes: “The Bible makes clear that there can be non-material causes (i.e., spiritual beings can cause physical effects) and that God’s sovereignty over the world includes the possibility of miracles and changes in physical “laws” (e.g., perhaps during the creation week, after the Fall, at the time of the Flood, after the return of Christ, etc.). This in itself already negates the presumptions inherent in mainstream historical science.”
I agree that spiritual beings can cause physical effects and that God performs miracles. But Dr. Byl engages in stunning speculation when he suggests that changes in the laws of physics might have occurred during the creation week, after the Fall, and at the time of the Flood. This is what the use of the Bible as a scientific textbook leads to. On the one hand Dr. Byl insists that we should stick to the Bible for knowledge on the history of the laws of physics and of life on earth. On the other hand, he goes beyond what Scripture warrants and gives free reign to his imagination. How much better is that than the origin science he rejects?
 Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987.
 Byl, John. God and Cosmos: A Christian View of Time, Space, and the Universe. Banner of Truth, 2001.
 Brooke, J. H. (1991) Science and religion: some historical perspectives. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge; Van der Meer, J.M. Ed. Facets of Faith and Science. 4 vols. The Pascal Centre for Advanced Studies in Faith and Science / University Press of America. Lanham: 1996; Brooke, J.H., Osler, M.J., Van der Meer, J.M. (Eds.) Science in Theistic Contexts: Cognitive Dimensions. Osiris 16. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 2001; Alexander, Denis R. and Numbers, Ronald L. eds. Biology and Ideology from Descartes to Dawkins. Chicago. University of Chicago Press: 2010.
 Galileo Galilei, Dialogues concerning two new sciences, trans. H. Crew and A. De Salvio. Evanston, Ill, 1946, pp. 80-81, 162-66). More examples in Kuhn, Thomas, The structure of scientific revolution, 2nd ed. University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1970.
 Based on Kuhn, Thomas S. “Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery.” Science, 136 (3518) June 1, 1962, 760-764.
 Kuhn, Thomas S. “Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery.” Science, 136 (3518) June 1, 1962, 760-764.
 Young, Davis A., Stearley, Ralph. The Bible, Rocks and Time: Geological Evidence for the Age of the Earth. InterVarsity Press Academic, Downers Grove, Ill. 2008, Chs. 14 and 15. link review
 Feyerabend, P. Against Method. London: Verso, 1975.
 Van der Meer, J.M. “Interpreting Nature and Scripture: A New Proposal for their Interaction.” In: Christianity and the Human Body: A Theology of the Human Body. eds. Robert Brungs, SJ and Marianne Postiglione, RSM, The ITEST Faith/Science Press: St. Louis, Missouri. 2001, pp. 38-72.
 Bavinck, H. Reformed Dogmatics, Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003, vol. 1, p. 444; italics in the original.